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Abstract
The Pareto eﬃciency criterion is often in conﬂict with the equity
criteria as no-envy or as egalitarian-equivalence: An allocation x that
is Pareto superior to another allocation y can be inferior to y in con-
sideration of equity. This paper formalizes two diﬀerent principles
of social choice under possible conﬂict of eﬃciency and equity. The
eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle requires that we should always select from
eﬃcient allocations, and when the eﬃciency criterion is not at all ef-
fective as a guide for selection, i.e., when all the available allocations
are eﬃcient or there is no eﬃcient allocation, we should apply an
equity criterion to choose desirable allocations. The equity-ﬁrst prin-
ciple reverses the lexicographic order of application of the two criteria.
We examine rationality of the social choice rules satisfying these two
principles. It is shown that the degree of rationality varies widely
depending on which principle the social choice rules represent. Sev-
eral impossibility and possibility results as well as a characterization
theorem are obtained.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D71, D63, D61.
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11 Introduction
Most economists accept the Pareto eﬃciency criterion as a criterion of social
desirability of resource allocations: An allocation x is Pareto superior to
an allocation y if no one is worse oﬀ and someone is strictly better oﬀ at
x than at y. An allocation is Pareto eﬃcient in a given set of available
allocations if no available allocation is Pareto superior to it. However, the
Pareto criterion is silent about the distributional equity of allocations but
concerns only eﬃcient use of resources.
On the other hand, severalconcepts of distributionalequity have been
extensively studied recently in economics. Two of them are central: no-envy
and egalitarian-equivalence.1 An allocation is envy-free if no one prefers the
consumption bundle of any other agent to his own. An allocation x meets
egalitarian-equivalence if and only if there is a consumption bundle x∗
0 such
that every agent is indiﬀerent between his bundle at x and the bundle x∗
0.
Particular subclasses of egalitarian equivalent allocations are also considered
by ﬁxing the direction of the reference consumption vectors. Given a vector
¯ r, an allocation x satisﬁes ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence if and only if there is a
realnumber t ∈ R such that every agent is indiﬀerent between his bundle
at x and the bundle tr. Each of these equity concepts does not depend on
cardinal utilities of agents, but is based only on ordinal preferences just as
the Pareto criterion is.
However, as Feldman and Kirman (1974) pointed out, there is a fun-
damentalconﬂict between the Pareto eﬃciency criterion and the equity-as-
no-envy criterion. There often exist two allocations x and y such that x is
Pareto superior to y whereas x is not envy-free but y is. The two criteria are
completely opposed to each other on which allocation is socially desirable.
Hence, if these two allocations {x,y} are the only policy options available
at the time, we cannot attain an allocation that is both Pareto eﬃcient in
{x,y} and envy-free, but we have to choose either an eﬃcient allocation or
an envy-free allocation. The same kind of conﬂict also arises between the
Pareto eﬃciency criterion and the equity-as-egalitarian-equivalence criterion
as shown in the present paper.
When two criteria of decision-makings are mutually inconsistent, it is
naturalto take one criterion as the ﬁrst principl e and the other as the sec-
1The concept of no-envy was introduced by Tinbergen(1953), Foley(1967) and
Kolm(1972), and that of egalitarian-equivalence by Pazner and Schmeidler(1978).
2ond. Some might think, as most economists do, that eﬃciency should be
considered ﬁrst, while others might argue that distributional equity should
always be kept for social stability. This paper formalizes these ideas. In the
eﬃciency-ﬁrst principle, we require that choice should always be made from
eﬃcient allocations whenever there are any. Then, an equity criterion should
be applied, as the second principle, when the eﬃciency criterion is not at
all eﬀective as a guide for selection, namely either when all the allocations
available are eﬃcient or when there is no eﬃcient allocation at all. In the
equity-ﬁrst principle, we reverse the order of application of the two criteria.
Requiring socialchoice correspondences to satisfy the eﬃciency-ﬁrst and
equity-second principle or the equity-ﬁrst and eﬃciency-second principle, we
study a classical issue in social choice theory: rationality of choice correspon-
dences. Severaldegrees of rational ity properties are considered. To examine
these properties is especially important as they are logically related to path
independence of socialchoice: “the independence of the ﬁnalchoice from
the path to it” (Arrow, 1963, p. 120). Path independence is an indispens-
able property of social choice rules. Were it violated, some arbitrary agenda
controls could aﬀect the ﬁnal choice, which is clearly undesirable.
We obtain severalimpossibil ity theorems on the existence of socialchoice
correspondences satisfying the eﬃciency-ﬁrst and equity-second-as-no-envy
principle (or equity-second-as-egalitarian-equivalence), and the weakest re-
quirement of rationality known as Chernoﬀ’s axiom (which is a necessary
condition for path independence). With ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence as the eq-
uity concept, there exists a socialchoice correspondence satisfying the above
properties. However, if we strengthens the rationality requirement to path
independence, we reach another impossibility.
By contrast, we establish the existence of social choice correspondences
satisfying the equity-ﬁrst and eﬃciency-second principle, and quasi-transitive
rationality (which is a suﬃcient condition for path independence). This pos-
sibility result holds with any concept of equity considered in this paper.
Moreover, we completely identify the social choice correspondence that sat-
isﬁes the equity-ﬁrst and eﬃciency-second principle, path independence, and
some additionalproperties.
It is often argued whether we should consider eﬃciency ﬁrst or equity ﬁrst
when we evaluate social desirability of allocations. Our results show that
possibility of consistent social decisions (in the sense of path independence)
depends crucially on which philosophical position we take.
32 Preliminaries
There are n agents and m inﬁnitely divisible goods, where n and m are some
ﬁnite numbers. Let N = {1,···,n} be the set of agents. Denoting by R the
set of realnumbers, the set R
m
+ is the consumption set of each agent. Let
R be the class of preference relations on R
m
+ that are reﬂexive, transitive,
complete, continuous, and monotonic. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with a
preference relation Ri in R. The strict preference relation and the indiﬀerence
relation of agent i are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively. A list of preference
relations, (Ri)i∈N ∈R n, is called a preference proﬁle, and denoted by RN.
An allocation is a vector x =( x1,···,x n) ∈ R
mn
+ where each xi =
(xi1,···,x im) ∈ R
m
+ is a consumption bundle of agent i ∈ N. The set of
all allocations is denoted by X.2 Let S be the set of all ﬁnite subsets of X.
Let a preference proﬁle RN ∈R n be given. An allocation x ∈ X is
Pareto superior to an allocation y ∈ X at RN if xiRiyi for all i ∈ N and
xiPiyi for some i ∈ N.I fx ∈ X is Pareto superior to y ∈ X at RN, we write
x  P(RN) y. For each S ∈S , an allocation x ∈ S is Pareto eﬃcient in S at
RN if there is no allocation y ∈ S such that y  P(RN) x. Let P(RN,S) be the
set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations in S at RN. An allocation x ∈ X is envy-
free at RN if xiRixj for all i,j ∈ N. For each S ∈S ,le t F(RN,S) be the
set of envy-free allocations in S at RN. An allocation x ∈ X is egalitarian-
equivalent at RN if there is a consumption bundle x0 ∈ R
m
+ such that for all
i ∈ N, xiIix0. Then, the bundle x0 is called a reference bundle for x.F o r
each S ∈S ,le t E(RN,S) be the set of egalitarian-equivalent allocations in
S at RN. Particular subclasses of egalitarian-equivalent allocations are often
studied in the literature. Let ¯ r ∈ R
m
++ be a given vector. An allocation
x ∈ X is egalitarian-equivalent for a ﬁxed reference ray with ¯ r at RN or
simply ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent at RN if there is a realnumber t ∈ R such
that for all i ∈ N, xiIit¯ r. For each S ∈S ,le t E¯ r(RN,S) be the set of
¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent allocations in S at RN.
A social choice correspondence is a set-valued function ϕ : Rn ×S→S
such that ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ S for all (RN,S) ∈R n×S. A socialchoice correspon-
dence is interpreted as follows: Let S ∈Sbe the set of allocations available,
which may be termed the environment following Arrow (1963, p. 15). Then
2We might impose a resource constraint on X. For example, given a total amount of
resources Ω ∈ R
m




i=1 xi ≤ Ω}. All the results in
this paper hold with this deﬁnition of X. However, by not imposing such a constraint on
X, we cover situations where the total amounts of resources may change.
4ϕ(RN,S) is the set of socially desirable allocations in the given environment
S when the preferences of the agents are RN. A fundamentalexampl e of a so-
cialchoice correspondence is the Pareto correspondence, denoted by P, which
associates with each (RN,S) ∈R n ×Sthe set of all Pareto eﬃcient alloca-
tions in S at RN. The No-Envy correspondence, the Egalitarian-Equivalence
correspondence, and the ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence correspondence, denoted
by F,E, and E¯ r, respectively, can be deﬁned analogously.
A remark should follow on the domain of social choice correspondences.
The domain consists of the preference domain R and the alternative domain
S. As in many contributions in the literature of social choice theory, we
assume that S is the class of all ﬁnite subsets of X. Our major interest here
is not in investigating what are “optimal” allocations in the set of all techno-
logically feasible allocations. There are many situations in which only a ﬁnite
number of policy options are at issue at any one time. In such situations,
we are rather interested in examining “consistency” of socialchoices at dif-
ferent times, or under expansions, contractions, or partitions of alternatives
available at hand. To that end, our choice of S would be appropriate.
3 The Axioms
This section introduces a variety of desirable properties of social choice cor-
respondences, which we call “axioms”. In the rest of the paper, we denote
by ϕ a socialchoice correspondence.
The ﬁrst axiom is familiar. It means that we should always select from
Pareto eﬃcient allocations if there are any.
Pareto Eﬃciency: For all ( RN,S) ∈R n ×S ,i fP(RN,S)  = ∅, then
ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ P(RN,S).
The next three axioms require that only equitable allocations should be
chosen whenever there are any.
No-Envy: For all ( RN,S) ∈R n ×S ,i fF(RN,S)  = ∅, then ϕ(RN,S) ⊆
F(RN,S).
Egalitarian-Equivalence: For all ( RN,S) ∈R n×S,i fE(RN,S)  = ∅, then
ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ E(RN,S).
5¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence: For all ( RN,S) ∈R n ×S,i fE¯ r(RN,S)  = ∅,
then ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ E¯ r(RN,S).
Even if the eﬃciency criterion is taken as the ﬁrst principle for social
choice, equity criteria should be used when the eﬃciency criterion is not at
all eﬀective as a guide for selection: either when all the available allocations
are eﬃcient or when no available allocation is so. Actually, most economists
seem to take this standpoint.
P-Conditional No-Envy3 : For all ( RN,S) ∈R n×S, if (i) P(RN,S)=S
or P(RN,S)=∅, and (ii) F(RN,S)  = ∅, then ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ F(RN,S).
The next axiom strengthens P-ConditionalNo-Envy. It means that if
either all the available allocations are eﬃcient or no available allocation is
eﬃcient, then all the envy-free allocations should be recommended. In other
words, it claims that no other criterion than the eﬃciency and equity criteria
deﬁned explicitly above should be involved as a selection principle.
P-Conditional No-Envy Inclusion: For all ( RN,S) ∈R n ×S , if (i)
P(RN,S)=S or P(RN,S)=∅, and (ii) F(RN,S)  = ∅, then ϕ(RN,S)=
F(RN,S).
By simply replacing the correspondence F with each of the correspondences
E and E¯ r in the above deﬁnitions, we deﬁne P-Conditional Egalitarian-
Equivalence and P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, respec-
tively, and their corresponding stronger versions.
Turnig now to the equity-ﬁrst and eﬃciency-second principle, we deﬁne
the counterparts of the above axioms. Let a socialchoice correspondence
Ψ ∈{ F,E,E¯ r} be given. (The correspondence Ψ is one of the three “equity
correspondences”.) If the equity criterion described by Ψ is accepted as the
ﬁrst selection principle, we may still apply the eﬃciency criterion when all the
allocations available are equitable, or when there is no equitable allocation
at all.
Ψ-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency: For all ( RN,S) ∈R n ×S , if (i)
Ψ(RN,S)=S or Ψ(RN,S)=∅, and (ii) P(RN,S)  = ∅, then ϕ(RN,S) ⊆
P(RN,S).
3The capital letter P stands for the Pareto correspondence.
6As an example, when Ψ = F, we write the above axiom F-Conditional
Pareto Eﬃciency. A strengthening of Ψ-ConditionalPareto Eﬃciency is
following.
Ψ-Conditional Pareto Inclusion: For all ( RN,S) ∈R n ×S , if (i)
Ψ(RN,S)=S or Ψ(RN,S)=∅, and (ii) P(RN,S)  = ∅, then ϕ(RN,S)=
P(RN,S).
Ever since Arrow (1951), it has been a centralissue in socialchoice theory
whether we could construct, by a satisfactory way, social choice correspon-
dences that are rational. Here, rationality means that the choice described
by the social choice correspondence from each set of available alternatives
could be obtained by maximization of some “well-behaved” social preference
relation. The question itself is of much theoretical interest, and moreover
it is worth examining because various degrees of rationality conditions are
logically related to an important choice-consistency condition called Path
Independence.
Let S be the set of available allocations, and {S1,S 2} be a partition
of S. Suppose that we ﬁrst choose desirable allocations ϕ(Si) from each
Si(i =1 ,2), and next make the ﬁnalchoice from ϕ(S1) ∪ ϕ(S2). Then, Path
Independence requires that for any partition of S, the ﬁnalchoice shoul d be
the same as ϕ(S), and hence the choice be independent of the way how to
partition S. Therefore, path independent socialchoice rul es are immune to
any agenda control.
Path Independence: For all RN ∈R n, and all S,S1,S 2 ∈S ,i fS = S1∪S2
and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, then ϕ(RN,ϕ(RN,S 1) ∪ ϕ(RN,S 2)) = ϕ(RN,S).
Path Independence implies the following condition, which was introduced
by Chernoﬀ (1954). Its intuitive meaning is also clear: If an allocation is
chosen from a bigger set S1, and it is still available in a smaller set S2 ⊂ S1,
then the allocation should be selected from the set S2 as well.
Chernoﬀ’s Axiom: For all RN ∈R n and all S1,S 2 ∈S ,i fS2 ⊆ S1, then
S2 ∩ ϕ(S1) ⊆ ϕ(S2).
Next we introduce severalrational ity conditions of socialchoice corre-
spondences, and describe their logical relations to Path Independence and
Chernoﬀ’s Axiom. Let   be an irreﬂexive and asymmetric binary relation
7on X, the interpretation of which is a strict socialpreference rel ation. 4 For
each S ∈S , denote by M (S) the set of maximalel ements of   in S, that
is,
M (S): ={x ∈ S | There exists no y ∈ S such that y   x}
Quasi-Transitive Rationality:5 For every RN ∈R n, there exists an ir-
reﬂexive, asymmetric, and transitive binary relation  (RN) on X such that
for all S ∈S , ϕ(RN,S)=M (RN)(S).
A weaker requirement than Quasi-Transitive Rationality is Acyclic Ra-
tionality. Let   be an irreﬂexive and asymmetric binary relation on X.W e
say that   has a cycle if there exist an integer K ≥ 3 and K allocations
x1,···,x K such that xk+1   xk for all k with 1 ≤ k<K , and x1   xK. The
binary relation   is acyclic if it has no cycle.
Acyclic Rationality: For every RN ∈R n, there exists an irreﬂexive, asym-
metric, and acyclic binary relation  (RN) on X such that for all S ∈S ,
ϕ(RN,S)=M (RN)(S).
It is well-known that given a binary relation   on X, the set M (S)i s
non-empty for all ﬁnite subsets S of X if and only if   is acyclic.
The conditions introduced above have the following logical relations.6
Quasi-Transitive Rationality implies both Acyclic Rationality and Path In-
dependence, and each of the two conditions, Acyclic Rationality and Path
Independence, implies Chernoﬀ’s Axiom. (See Figure 1.) Hence, Chernoﬀ’s
Axiom may be considered as the minimalrequirement on rational ity of social
choice correspondences.
Quasi-Transitive Rationality =⇒ Acyclic Rationality
⇓⇓
Path Independence =⇒ Chernoﬀ’s Axiom
Figure 1: Logical relations of rationality conditions
4It will be convenient for us to present the results by strict social preference relations  .
However, we could alternatively use the reﬂexive and complete social preference relations
  induced from   as follows: For all x,y ∈ X, x   y if and only if y   x does not hold.
5The term “quasi-transitivity” is due to Sen (1970), which means transitivity of strict
social preference relations.
6See Suzumura (1983, Ch. 3).
8Our ﬁnal axiom is an obvious requirement: Social choice rules should be
able to select some allocations for any environment.
Non-Emptiness: For all RN ∈R n and all S ∈S , ϕ(RN,S)  = ∅.
4 Conﬂicts between Eﬃciency and Equity
This section reviews the fundamentalconﬂict between the Pareto eﬃciency
criterion and the equity criteria. First, we observe the conﬂict between eﬃ-
ciency and no-envy. Consider the following example, which is essentially due
to Feldman and Kirman (1974).
Example 1 There are two agents N = {1,2} and two goods {1,2}. The
preferences of the agents are represented by the utility functions
u1(x11,x 12)=x11x12
u2(x21,x 22)=2 x21 + x22
Let x =( x1,x 2) = ((1, 46
5 ),(9, 4





since u1(y1) >u 1(x1) and u2(y2) >u 2(x2), the allocation y is Pareto superior
to the allocation x. However, x is envy-free because u1(x1) >u 1(x2) and
u2(x2) >u 2(x1), whereas y is not since u1(y2) >u 1(y1).7 Now let S =
{x,y}. Then, both the sets P(RN,S) and F(RN,S) are non-empty, but the
intersection of the two sets is empty.
This example can be extended to the case of any ﬁnite numbers of agents
and goods. Hence, we have the following impossibility.
Theorem 1 [Feldman and Kirman (1974), Suzumura (1981a)] There exists
no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency, and No-Envy.
Next we show that the same kind of conﬂict may also arise between the
Pareto eﬃciency criterion and the equity-as-egalitarian-equivalence criterion.
7Moreover, at y, agent 2 receives more of every good than agent 1. Hence, even the no-
domination condition, which is a weaker requirement of equity than no-envy, is violated.
(An allocation x ∈ X satisﬁes no-domination if there exist no i,j ∈ N such that xik >x jk
for all k =1 ,···,m. Under monotonicity of preference relations, no-envy implies no-
domination.)
9Example 2 There are two agents N = {1,2} and two goods 1,2. The
preferences of the agents are represented by the utility functions8
u1(x11,x 12) = min{x11,x 12}
u2(x21,x 22)=x21 +3 x22
Let x =( x1,x 2) = ((3,11),(9,1)) and y =( y1,y 2) = ((8,8),(4,4)). Let
¯ r =( 1 ,1). Then, the allocation y is Pareto superior to the allocation x.O n
the other hand, since u1(x1)=3=u1(3¯ r) and u2(x2) = 12 = u2(3¯ r), the
allocation x is ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent with 3¯ r being the reference bundle.
However, y is not egalitarian-equivalent because for any bundle z0 such that
u1(z0)=u1(x1), z0 ≥ (8,8) and hence u2(z0) ≥ u2(8,8) >u 2(4,4) = u2(y2).
The above example also shows that the equity-as-¯ r-egalitarian-
equivalence criterion may conﬂict with the Pareto eﬃciency criterion.
Theorem 2 (i) There exists no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes
Non-Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, and Egalitarian-Equivalence. (ii) There
exists no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, Pareto
Eﬃciency, and ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence.
5 The Eﬃciency-First Principle
When two criteria of decision-makings are mutually inconsistent, it is natural
to take one criterion as the ﬁrst principle and the other as the second. In this
section, we accept the eﬃciency criterion as the ﬁrst, keeping the requirement
of Pareto Eﬃciency on socialchoice correspondences. As for equity criteria,
however, we only require their conditional versions: the equity criteria should
be applied when the eﬃciency criterion is not at all eﬀective as a guide for
selection, i.e., either when all the allocations available are eﬃcient or when
there is no eﬃcient allocation.
By the deﬁnitions of axioms, Pareto Eﬃciency and P-Conditional
No-Envy (or P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence, P-Conditional ¯ r-
Egalitarian-Equivalence) together are compatible with Non-Emptiness.
Then, we examine with which rationality or choice-consistency conditions
these axioms are compatible. In order to present the results, we introduce
some socialpreference rel ations.
8We use Leontief preferences only for easy calculations. An example can be constructed
with smooth and strictly monotonic preferences
105.1 No-Envy as the Second Criterion
Let RN ∈R n be given. We say that two allocations x ∈ X and y ∈ X
are Pareto noncomparable at RN if neither x nor y is Pareto superior to the
other. We also say that an allocation x is equity-as-no-envy superior to an
allocation y at RN if x is envy-free but y is not. Two allocations x and y are
equity-as-no-envy noncomparable at RN if neither x nor y is equity-as-no-envy
superior to the other.
Given RN ∈R n, deﬁne the binary relation  PF(RN) on X as follows:
For all x,y ∈ X, x  PF(RN) y if and only if (i) x is Pareto superior to y
at RN, or (ii) x and y are Pareto noncomparable and x is equity-as-no-envy
superior to y at RN. We call  PF(RN) the binary relation of eﬃciency-ﬁrst
and equity-second-as-no-envy at RN.
Under the socialpreference rel ation  PF(RN), we ﬁrst apply the Pareto
superior criterion when we rank any two allocations. Then, only when the
two allocations are noncomparable in the Pareto superior criterion, we apply
the equity-as-no-envy criterion.
The next lemma clariﬁes the relation between the social preference re-
lation  PF(RN) and the socialchoice correspondences satisfying Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency, P-ConditionalNo-Envy, and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom.
Lemma 1 If a social choice correspondence ϕ satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃciency, P-
Conditional No-Envy, and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom, then ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ M PF(RN )(S)
for all (RN,S) ∈R n ×S.
Proof. Suppose that a socialchoice correspondence ϕ satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency, P-ConditionalNo-Envy, and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom. Let ( RN,S) ∈R n×S
be given. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists x ∈ S such that
x ∈ ϕ(RN,S) but x/ ∈ M PF(RN )(S). Then, there exists y ∈ S such that
y  PF(RN) x. Because x ∈ ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ P(RN,S) by Pareto Eﬃciency,
y is not Pareto superior to x. Hence, y  PF(RN) x holds only if x and
y are Pareto noncomparable, and y is envy-free whereas x is not. Let
S  = {x,y}. Then, S  ⊆ S, and P(RN,S )=S . By P-ConditionalNo-
Envy, ϕ(RN,S ) ⊆ F(RN,S ). Thus, x/ ∈ ϕ(RN,S ). This means, however,
that ϕ violates Chernoﬀ’s Axiom, which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
For any binary relation  , the set M (S) is non-empty for all S ∈S
if and only if   is acyclic. Hence, it follows from the above lemma that
11there exist socialchoice correspondences satisfying the three axioms and Non-
Emptiness only if  PF(RN) is acyclic. Unfortunately, the social preference
relation  PF(RN) may have a cycle as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 1 There exist a preference proﬁle RN ∈R n such that the bi-
nary relation of eﬃciency-ﬁrst and equity-second-as-no-envy at RN,  PF(RN),
has a cycle.
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we consider a two-agent and two-good
economy. Similar examples can be constructed for the case of any numbers
of agents and goods. Let N = {1,2} be the set of agents. Assume that each
agent i ∈ N has the preference relation Ri on R
2
+ that is represented by the
following utility function ui:
u1(x11,x 12)=x11x12
u2(x21,x 22)=2 x21 + x22
Deﬁne four allocations x,y,z and w by x = ((1,9),(9,1)),y =
((3,6),(7,4)),z = ((2,8),(8,2)), and w = ((2,7),(8,3)). Then, x  PF(RN) y
since x and y are Pareto-noncomparable, and x is envy-free but y is not
so. Since y is Pareto superior to z, we have y  PF(RN) z. Because z and
w are Pareto-noncomparable, and z is envy-free while w is not, we have
z  PF(RN) w. Finally, w  PF(RN) x follows from the fact that w is Pareto
superior to x. Thus, the relation  PF(RN) has a cycle. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, the next impossibility theorem follows.
Theorem 3 There exists no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional No-Envy, and Chernoﬀ’s Ax-
iom.
We argued that Path Independence is an indispensable property of social
choice correspondences. However, since Path Independence implies Cher-
noﬀ’s Axiom, we have the following impossibility as a corollary of Theorem
3.
Corollary 1 There exists no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional No-Envy, and Path Indepen-
dence.
125.2 Egalitarian-Equivalence as the Second Criterion
Next, we adopt egalitarian-equivalence as the concept of equity instead of no-
envy. The analyses will go parallel to those in the previous subsection. We
deﬁne the binary relation of eﬃciency-ﬁrst and equity-second-as-egalitarian-
equivalence at RN ∈R n, denoted  PE(RN), by simply replacing in the deﬁni-
tion of  PF(RN) the “equity-as-no-envy superior” relation with the “equity-
as-egalitarian-equivalence superior” relation.
Just as Lemma 1, we can show that if a socialchoice correspondence ϕ
satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence, and Cher-
noﬀ’s Axiom, then ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ M PE(RN )(S) for all (RN,S) ∈R n×S. Hence,
whether the socialpreference rel ation  PE(RN) is acyclic or not is a crucial
question for the existence of socialchoice correspondence satisfying the three
axioms and Non-Emptiness. However,  PE(RN) may have a cycle.
Proposition 2 There exists a preference proﬁle RN ∈R n such that the
binary relation of eﬃciency-ﬁrst and equity-second-as-egalitarian-equivalence
at RN,  PE(RN), has a cycle.
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we consider a two-agent and two-good
economy. Let N = {1,2} be the set of agents. Agent 1’s preference relation
R1 on R
2
+ is represented by a Leontief utility function:
u1(x11,x 12) = min{x11,x 12}
Agent 2’s preference relation R2 is represented by the following piece-wise
linear utility function:
u2(x21,x 22)=x21 +2 0i fx22 ≥ x21 and x22 ≥ 20
u2(x21,x 22)=x21 + x22 if x22 ≥ x21 and x22 ≤ 20
u2(x21,x 22)=2 x22 if x22 ≤ x21
Deﬁne four allocations x,y,z and w by x = ((18,9),(10,19)),y =
((12,10),(16,18)),z = ((23,11),(5,17)) and w = ((17,15),(11,13)). Then,
observe the following facts:
(1) The allocation y is Pareto superior to the allocation x.
(2) Also, w is Pareto superior to z.
(3) However, y and z are Pareto noncomparable.
(4) Similarly, x and w are Pareto noncomparable.
13(5) On the other hand, the allocation x is egalitarian-equivalent with a refer-
ence bundle (9,20) since u1(x1)=9=u1(9,20) and u2(x2) = 29 = u2(9,20).
(6) Similarly, z is egalitarian equivalent with a reference bundle (11,11).
(7) However, y is not egalitarian-equivalent because for all a0 ∈ R
2
+ such that
u2(a0)=u2(y2) = 34, a0 ≥ (13,13), and hence u1(a0) ≥ u1(13,13) = 13 >
10 = u1(y1).
(8) Similarly, w is not egalitarian-equivalent since for all b0 ∈ R
2
+ such that
u1(b0)=u1(w1) = 15, b0 ≥ (15,15), and thus u2(b0) ≥ u2(15,15) = 30 >
24 = u2(w2).
By (1), we have y  PE(RN) x. It follows from (3), (6) and (7) that
z  PE(RN) y. By (2), w  PE(RN) z. Finally, from (4), (5) and (8) together,
we have x  PE(RN) w. Thus, the relation  PE(RN) has a cycle. Q.E.D.
By Proposition 2, we have the following impossibility results.
Theorem 4 There exists no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence, and
Chernoﬀ’s Axiom.
Corollary 2 There exists no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional Egalitarian-Equivalence, and
Path Independence.
5.3 ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence as the Second Criterion
We have reached an impossibility again with egalitarian-equivalence as the
second criterion. In this subsection, we adopt a more restricted concept of
equity than egalitarian-equivalence, namely ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence. Recall
that the reference bundle of any ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent allocation must lie
in the direction of the given vector ¯ r, while there is no such restriction in the
deﬁnition of (general) egalitarian-equivalent allocations. With ¯ r-egalitarian-
equivalence as the second criterion, we have a positive result as shown next.
We deﬁne the binary relation of eﬃciency-ﬁrst and equity-second-as-¯ r-
egalitarian-equivalence at RN ∈R n, denoted  PE¯ r(RN), by replacing in the
deﬁnition of  PF(RN) the “equity-as-no-envy superior” relation with the
“equity-as-¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence superior” relation. As in Lemma 1, it
can be shown that if a socialchoice correspondence ϕ satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃ-
ciency, P-Conditional¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom, then
ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ M PE¯ r(RN)(S) for all (RN,S) ∈R n ×S.
14Proposition 3 For all RN ∈R n, the binary relation of eﬃciency-ﬁrst and
equity-second-as-¯ r-egalitarian-equivalence at RN,  PE¯ r(RN), is acyclic.
To prove the above proposition, we ﬁrst establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let RN ∈R n be given. Suppose that there exist an integer K>2
and K allocations x1,···,x K ∈ X such that for all k ∈{ 1,···,K − 1},
xk+1  PE¯ r(RN) xk. Suppose further that there exist k1,k 2 ∈{ 1,···,K} with
k1 <k 2 such that xk1 ∈ E¯ r(RN,X), xk2 ∈ E¯ r(RN,X), and for all integers k
with k1 <k<k 2, xk / ∈ E¯ r(RN,X). Then, for all i ∈ N, x
k2
i  i xk1.
Proof. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: k2 = k1 +1 .
Because both of xk1 and xk2 are ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent, xk2  PE¯ r(RN) xk1
holds only if xk2 is Pareto superior to xk1. Hence, there is an agent j ∈ N




j . Since xk1,x k2 ∈ E¯ r(RN,X), there are λ1,λ 2 ∈ R
such that x
k1
i Iiλ1¯ r and x
k2
i Iiλ2¯ r for all i ∈ N, and in particular for the above
agent j. Together with (1), this implies that λ2 >λ 1 by monotonicity of
preferences. Therefore, for all i ∈ N, x
k2
i Iiλ2¯ rPiλ1¯ rIix
k1
i .
Case 2: k2 >k 1 +1 .
For all integers k with k1 +1≤ k ≤ k2 −1, xk / ∈ E¯ r(RN,X). Hence, for all k
with k1 ≤ k ≤ k2 −2, xk+1  PE¯ r(RN) xk holds only if xk+1 is Pareto superior
to xk. By the transitivity of the Pareto superior relation, we have (2) xk2−1
is Pareto superior to xk1. Since xk2  PE¯ r(RN) xk2−1 and xk2 ∈ E¯ r(RN,X),
either (3) xk2 is Pareto superior to xk2−1 or (4) xk2 and xk2−1 are Pareto




i for all i ∈ N, then xk2−1
becomes ¯ r-egalitarian-equivalent, which contradicts the supposition. Thus,









j . The rest of the argument is the
same as in Case 1, and we omit it. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let RN ∈R n be given. To lighten notation,
we simply write  PE¯ r,  P, and E¯ r for  PE¯ r(RN),  P(RN), and E¯ r(RN,X),
respectively. Suppose that there exist an integer K>2 and K allocations
x1,···,x K such that for all k ∈{ 1,···,K− 1}, xk+1  PE¯ r xk. We want to
show that it is not true that x1  PE¯ r xK.
If xk / ∈ E¯ r for all k ∈{ 1,···,K}, then xk+1  P xk for all k ∈{ 1,···,K−
1}, and by the transitivity of  P, we have xK  P x1 and so xK  PE¯ r x1.
Suppose that there exists k ∈{ 1,···,K} with xk ∈ E¯ r. Let k∗ :=
min{k | xk ∈ E¯ r} and k∗∗ := max{k | xk ∈ E¯ r}. We distinguish two cases.
15Case 1: k∗ =1 .
If k∗∗ = K, then by using Lemma 2 (repeatedly), we have xK  P x1, and
xK  PE¯ r x1. Suppose that k∗∗ <K . Then for all integers k with k∗∗ +1≤
k ≤ K, xk / ∈ E¯ r, and hence xk  PE¯ r xk−1 holds only if xk  P xk−1. Thus,
(1) xK  P xk∗∗
.I fk∗∗ = k∗ = 1, then xK  P x1. Otherwise, by Lemma 2,
we have that xk∗∗
 P xk∗
= x1, and together with (1), xK  P x1. Hence,
xK  PE¯ r x1.
Case 2: k∗ > 1.
We prove by way of contradiction that x1  PE¯ r xK does not hold. Suppose,
on the contrary, that (2) x1  PE¯ r xK. Then, since x1 / ∈ E¯ r, (2) holds only
if (3) x1  P xK. Let k be an integer with k  = k∗. (4) If 1 <k<k ∗ or
k∗∗ <k≤ K, then xk / ∈ E¯ r, and xk  P xk−1 must hold. (5) By Lemma
2, if k∗∗  = k∗, then xk∗∗
 P xk∗
. By the transitivity of  P, (3), (4) and
(5) together imply that xk∗−1  P xk∗. But this means that xk∗−1  PE¯ r xk∗,
which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
A positive result follows from the above proposition.
Theorem 5 There exists a social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, and
Acyclic Rationality.
Proof. Deﬁne the socialchoice correspondence ϕPE¯ r by
ϕPE¯ r(RN,S)=M PE¯ r(RN)(S) for all (RN,S) ∈R
n ×S
Let (RN,S) ∈R n ×Sbe given. Since S is a ﬁnite set, P(RN,S)  = ∅.F o r
any x ∈ S,i fx/ ∈ P(RN,S), then there exists y ∈ S that is Pareto superior to
x, and hence y  PE¯ r(RN) x, which implies x/ ∈ M PE¯ r(RN)(S)=ϕPE¯ r(RN,S).
Thus, ϕPE¯ r(RN,S) ⊆ P(RN,S). Because this relation holds for all (RN,S) ∈
Rn×S, ϕPE¯ r satisﬁes Pareto Eﬃciency. By a similar argument, we can show
that ϕPE¯ r satisﬁes P-Conditional¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence. Finally, Acyclic
Rationality and Non-Emptiness follow from Proposition 3 and the deﬁnition
of ϕPE¯ r. Q.E.D.
It can be checked that the socialchoice correspondence ϕPE¯ r deﬁned in
the above proof satisﬁes E¯ r-Conditional Pareto Inclusion as well. However,
it violates Path Independence. In fact, here is another impossibility.
Theorem 6 There exists no social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional ¯ r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, E¯ r-
Conditional Pareto Inclusion, and Path Independence.
16Proof. Consider the economy as deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 2. Let
¯ r =( 9 ,20). Deﬁne three allocations x,y and w by x = ((18,9),(10,19)),y=
((12,10),(16,18)) and w = ((17,15),(11,13)). Then, the allocation x is ¯ r-
egalitarian-equivalent, but the other two allocations are not. On the other
hand, the allocation y is Pareto superior to the allocation x, but y and w are
Pareto noncomparable. The allocations x and w are Pareto noncomparable
either.
Suppose that there exists a socialchoice correspondence ϕ that satisﬁes
Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional¯r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, E¯ r-Conditional
Pareto Inclusion, Path Independence, and Non-Emptiness. It follows from
Pareto Eﬃciency, P-Conditional¯r-Egalitarian-Equivalence, and Path Inde-
pendence (which implies Chernoﬀ’s Axiom) that
ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ M PE¯ r(RN)(S) for all (RN,S) ∈R
n ×S (1)
Let S1 = {x,y,w}, S2 = {x,y} and S3 = {w}. Then, M PE¯ r(RN)(S1)={y}
and M PE¯ r(RN)(S2)={y}. By the relation (1) and Non-Emptiness of ϕ,w e
have
ϕ(RN,S 1)={y} and ϕ(RN,S 2)={y} (2)
By Non-Emptiness, ϕ(RN,S 3)={w}. Hence,
ϕ(RN,ϕ(RN,S 2) ∪ ϕ(RN,S 3)) = ϕ(RN,{y,w}) (3)
Observe that E¯ r(RN,{y,w})=∅ and P(RN,{y,w})={y,w}. Since ϕ
satisﬁes E¯ r-ConditionalPareto Incl usion, we have
ϕ(RN,{y,w})={y,w} (4)
It follows from (2), (3) and (4) that ϕ(RN,ϕ(RN,S 2) ∪ ϕ(RN,S 3))  =
ϕ(RN,S 1). This means that ϕ violates Path Independence, which is a con-
tradiction. Q.E.D.
6 The Equity-First Principle
In this section, we reverse the order of application of the eﬃciency and equity
criteria. That is, we ﬁrst apply an equity criterion to select allocations, and
then the eﬃciency criterion only conditionally. The results turn out to be
17remarkably diﬀerent from those obtained in the previous section. In the
following, we only consider the equity-as-no-envy criterion. Essentially the
same results hold true with the other two equity concepts.
To identify the socialchoice correspondences satisfying No-Envy, F-
ConditionalPareto Eﬃciency and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom, a socialpreference re-
lation is introduced here.
Given RN ∈R n, deﬁne the binary relation  FP(RN) on X as follows: For
all x,y ∈ X, x  FP(RN) y if and only if (i) x is equity-as-no-envy superior
to y at RN, or (ii) x and y are equity-as-no-envy noncomparable and x is
Pareto superior to y at RN. We call  FP(RN) the binary relation of equity-
ﬁrst-as-no-envy and eﬃciency-second at RN. Under this socialpreference
relation, we ﬁrst apply the equity-no-envy criterion when we rank any two
allocations. Then, only when the two allocations are not comparable in the
equity-as-no-envy criterion, the eﬃciency criterion is used to rank them.
The next lemma is the counterpart of Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 If a social choice correspondence ϕ satisﬁes No-Envy, F-
Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency, and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom, then ϕ(RN,S) ⊆
M FP(RN )(S) for all (RN,S) ∈R n ×S.
Proof. Suppose that a socialchoice correspondence ϕ satisﬁes No-Envy,
F-ConditionalPareto Eﬃciency, and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom. Let ( RN,S) ∈R n×
S be given. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists x ∈ S such that
x ∈ ϕ(RN,S) but x/ ∈ M FP(RN )(S). Then, there exists y ∈ S such that
y  FP(RN) x. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: F(RN,S)  = ∅.
Because x ∈ ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ F(RN,S) by No-Envy, y  FP(RN) x holds only if
both x and y are envy-free, and y is Pareto superior to x. Let S  = {x,y}.
Then, S  ⊆ S, and F(RN,S )=S . By F-ConditionalPareto Eﬃciency,
ϕ(RN,S ) ⊆ P(RN,S )={y}. Thus, x/ ∈ ϕ(RN,S ). This means that ϕ
violates Chernoﬀ’s Axiom, which is a contradiction.
Case 2: F(RN,S)=∅.
Then, y  FP(RN) x holds only if y is Pareto superior to x. Let S  = {x,y}.
Then, S  ⊆ S, and F(RN,S )=∅. By F-ConditionalPareto Eﬃciency,
ϕ(RN,S ) ⊆ P(RN,S )={y}. The rest of the argument is the same as Case
1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 For all RN ∈R n, the binary relation of equity-ﬁrst-as-no-
envy and eﬃciency-second at RN,  FP(RN), is transitive.
18Proof. Let RN ∈R n be given. To lighten notation, we simply write  FP,
 P, and F for FP(RN),  P(RN), and F(RN,X), respectively. Assume that
x  FP y and y  FP z.B yx  FP y,
(1) x ∈ F and y/ ∈ F or
(2) [[x ∈ F and y ∈ F]o r[ x/ ∈ F and y/ ∈ F]] and x  P y
By y  FP z,
(3) y ∈ F and z/ ∈ F or
(4) [[y ∈ F and z ∈ F]o r[ y/ ∈ F and z/ ∈ F]] and y  P z
(1) and (3) are incompatible. If (1) and (4) hold, then we must have x ∈ F
and z/ ∈ F. Hence, x  FP z. Similarly, if (2) and (3) hold, then x ∈ F but
z/ ∈ F, and we have x  FP z. If (2) and (4) hold, then either x,y,z ∈ F
and x  P y  P z or x,y,z / ∈ F and x  P y  P z. Since the relation  P is
transitive, we have x  FP z. Q.E.D.
The next possibility theorem relies on the above proposition.
Theorem 7 There exists a social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, No-Envy, F-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency, and Quasi-Transitive
Rationality.
Proof. Deﬁne the socialchoice correspondence ϕFP by
ϕFP(RN,S)=M FP(RN )(S) for all (RN,S) ∈R
n ×S
Then, by a similar argument to the proof of Theorem 5, we can show that
ϕFP satisﬁes No-Envy and F-ConditionalPareto Eﬃciency. By Proposition
4, ϕFP satisﬁes Quasi-Transitive Rationality. Since any quasi-transitive bi-
nary relation has maximal elements in any ﬁnite set, Non-Emptiness follows.
Q.E.D.
Since Quasi-Transitive Rationality implies Path Independence, the next
corollary follows from Theorem 7. This corollary should be contrasted with
Corollary 1.
Corollary 3 There exists a social choice correspondence that satisﬁes Non-
Emptiness, No-Envy, F-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency, and Path Indepen-
dence.
19In the proof of Theorem 7, we deﬁned the socialchoice correspondence
ϕFP as ϕFP(RN,S)=M FP(RN )(S) for all (RN,S) ∈R n ×S. This corre-
spondence takes the following values:
ϕ(RN,S)=P(RN,F(RN,S)) if F(RN,S)  = ∅
ϕ(RN,S)=P(RN,S)i fF(RN,S)=∅
Note that for all (RN,S) ∈R n×S, P(RN,F(RN,S)) ⊇ P(RN,S)∩F(RN,S)
and there are (RN,S) ∈R n ×Ssuch that P(RN,F(RN,S))  = P(RN,S) ∩
F(RN,S). Our ﬁnalresul t is a characterization of this socialchoice corre-
spondence.
Theorem 8 A social choice correspondence ϕ satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, No-
Envy, P-Conditional No-Envy Inclusion, F-Conditional Pareto Inclusion,
and Path Independence if and only if ϕ = ϕFP.
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 7, ϕFP satisﬁes Non-Emptiness, No-
Envy, F-ConditionalPareto Eﬃciency, and Path Independence. As easil y
checked, it also satisﬁes P-Conditional No-Envy Inclusion and F-Conditional
Pareto Inclusion.
Suppose that there is a socialchoice correspondence ϕ with ϕ  = ϕFP that
satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms. Then, there is (RN,S) ∈R n ×Ssuch that
ϕ(RN,S)  = ϕFP(RN,S) (1)
If F(RN,S)=∅, then by F-ConditionalPareto Incl usion, ϕ(RN,S)=
P(RN,S). On the other hand, it can be checked that ϕFP(RN,S)=
M FP(RN )(S)=P(RN,S). Hence, we have ϕ(RN,S)=ϕFP(RN,S), a con-
tradiction. Thus, F(RN,S)  = ∅. Since F-ConditionalPareto Incl usion im-
plies F-Conditional Pareto Eﬃciency, and Path Independence implies Cher-
noﬀ’s Axiom, it follows from Lemma 3 that
ϕ(RN,S) ⊆ M FP(RN )(S)=ϕFP(RN,S) (2)
Because F(RN,S)  = ∅, we have
M FP(RN )(S)=P(RN,F(RN,S)) (3)
It follows from (1), (2) and (3) that there exists x∗ ∈ S such that x∗ ∈
P(RN,F(RN,S)) but x∗ / ∈ ϕ(RN,S). Deﬁne S  := {x∗}∪{ y ∈ S | y ∈
20F(RN,S) and x∗  P(RN) y}∪[S\F(RN,S)]. By Lemma 3, ϕ(RN,S ) ⊆
M FP(RN )(S )={x∗}. By Non-Emptiness, we have ϕ(RN,S )={x∗}. Deﬁne
S   := S\S . Again from Lemma 3, it follows that
ϕ(RN,S
  ) ⊆ M FP(RN )(S
  )=P(RN,F(RN,S
  )) (4)
Claim: P(RN,F(RN,S  )) ⊂ P(RN,F(RN,S)).
Let z ∈ P(RN,F(RN,S  )). Then, z ∈ F(RN,S  ) ⊂ F(RN,S). Sup-
pose that z/ ∈ P(RN,F(RN,S)). Then, there exists w ∈ P(RN,F(RN,S))
such that w  P(RN) z.I f w = x∗, then z ∈ S  and hence z/ ∈ S  ,
which is a contradiction. Thus, w  = x∗. But then, w ∈ S   and so
z/ ∈ P(RN,F(RN,S  )), which contradicts z ∈ P(RN,F(RN,S  )). There-
fore, we must have z ∈ P(RN,F(RN,S)). Thus, the claim has been proved.
It follows from (4) and the above claim that ϕ(RN,S  ) ⊆
P(RN,F(RN,S)). Hence, ϕ(RN,S ) ∪ ϕ(RN,S  )={x∗}∪ϕ(RN,S  ) ⊆
P(RN,F(RN,S)). Therefore, P(RN,ϕ(RN,S ) ∪ ϕ(RN,S  )) = ϕ(RN,S ) ∪
ϕ(RN,S  ). Then, by P-Conditional No-Envy Inclusion, we conclude that
ϕ(RN,ϕ(RN,S )∪ϕ(RN,S  )) = F(RN,ϕ(RN,S )∪ϕ(RN,S  )) = ϕ(RN,S )∪
ϕ(RN,S  )={x∗}∪ϕ(RN,S  ). But since x∗ / ∈ ϕ(RN,S)=ϕ(RN,S  ∪ S  )
and ϕ satisﬁes Path Independence, we must have x∗ / ∈ ϕ(RN,ϕ(RN,S ) ∪
ϕ(RN,S  )). This is a contradiction.
Therefore, there is no socialchoice correspondence ϕ with ϕ  = ϕFP that
satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms together in the statement of the theorem. Q.E.D.
7 Concluding Remarks
In his two seminalpapers, Suzumura (1981a, b) examined possibil ity of con-
structing social choice correspondences satisfying the following conditions on
eﬃciency and equity as well as choice-consistency.
Fairness Extension: For all ( RN,S) ∈R n ×S, ϕ(RN,S)=P(RN,S) ∩
F(RN,S)i fP(RN,S) ∩ F(RN,S)  = ∅.
Fairness Inclusion: For all ( RN,S) ∈R n×S,i fP(RN,S)∩F(RN,S)=∅,
y ∈ ϕ(RN,S), and x ∈ S is Pareto superior to y or equity-as-no-envy superior
to y at RN, then x ∈ ϕ(RN,S).
Superset Axiom: For all RN ∈R n, and all S1,S 2 ∈S ,i fS1 ⊆ S2 and
ϕ(RN,S 2) ⊆ ϕ(RN,S 1), then ϕ(RN,S 2)=ϕ(RN,S 1).
21Suzumura (1981a) showed that there exists no socialchoice correspondence
satisfying Fairness Extension, Unrestricted Domain, and Superset Axiom. He
also established another impossibility theorem that involves Fairness Inclu-
sion and Chernoﬀ’s Axiom as the central requirements. Recently, Denicol` o
(1997) studied compatibility of Fairness Extension with a version of Arrow’s
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
The ﬁrst diﬀerence between Suzumura (1981a,b) and this paper lies in
the domain of social choice correspondences. While he considered a class of
abstract social choice problems, we study economic domains. All our results
stand on the standard assumptions on agents’ preferences in economics. How-
ever, the results in this paper involving no-envy as the equity concept can be
adapted into the framework of abstract social choice problems. (Egalitarian-
equivalence can be deﬁned only on the economic domains.)
Secondly, our results are logically independent of Suzumura’s impossibil-
ity theorems. There are no logical relations between Fairness Extension and
any one or any combination of our axioms concerning eﬃciency and equity.9
On the other hand, combined with the requirement of Non-Emptiness, Fair-
ness Inclusion is incompatible with either of our axioms Pareto Eﬃciency
and No-Envy. To explore the reason, let us reconsider the case of fundamen-
talconﬂict between the Pareto criterion and the equity-as-no-envy criterion
as in Section 4. In Example 1, the allocation y is Pareto superior to the
allocation x, whereas x is equity-as-no-envy-superior to y. Then, if a so-
cialchoice correspondence ϕ satisﬁes Non-Emptiness and Fairness Inclusion,
then ϕ({x,y})={x,y}. That is, any correspondence satisfying this axiom
avoids selection in face of the fundamental conﬂict. To the contrary, the cor-
respondences satisfying our eﬃciency-ﬁrst or equity-ﬁrst axioms does make
a selection in the case of the fundamental conﬂict, depending upon which
criterion should be placed ﬁrst.
This paper started with the simple question: “Which criterion should we
take ﬁrst to select socially desirable allocations, the eﬃciency criterion or
the equity criterion?” We have represented two alternative principles in the
forms of axioms. We have then examined rationality (or choice-consistency)
of the socialchoice correspondences satisfying these axioms.
The axioms introduced in this paper reﬂect alternative value judgements
when we are faced with the fundamentalconﬂict between eﬃciency and eq-
uity. Some axioms seem to be easily followed by most economists, and others
9There is no logical relation between Chernoﬀ’s Axiom and Superset Axiom, either.
22may be accepted as ethically more desirable by philosophers. The objective
of the present paper is not to advocate a particular value judgement as the
best, but to show how the choice among alternative value judgements aﬀects
the possibility of consistent social choices. Indeed, the degree of rationality of
social choice correspondences varies widely depending on which principle the
correspondences represent. The lack of rationality may be considered as the
“cost” of taking a particular value judgement. Of course, the “cost” should
be taken into account when making a choice among various philosophical
principles.
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